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WHAT DOMESDAY BOOKS FOR
EMERGING LAW?

Roger

J. Traynor*

Once upon a time, in the eleventh century reign of William the
Conqueror, scribes compiled a Domesday Book that set forth the
economic resources of the realm and named the resourceful holders.
Mainly it described landholdings, and the king's men paid it close
heed, the better to tax the taxable.
No one in the eleventh century could have predicted that the
Domesday Book would become the archetype of internal revenue
codes. None could have conceived of all the busy words that scamper
back and forth to ferret out all the economic resources of the land,
the better to tax the taxpayers, except of course for those who know
the arcane ways out of the wayward words. Still, the giant shadow
that taxation casts on virtually all law in the twentieth century harks
back so relevantly to the tithes of ancient days that one might be
tempted to invoke the old saw that plus ga change, plus c'est la mime
chose, or for that matter la meme chose in action.
Lawyers trained to see saws in a skeptical light, however, are
coming to realize that when the winds of change reach hurricane
speed, the shaken landscapes are never again the same. We cannot
find the way back to the eleventh century, or to the nineteenth, or
even to the early years of our own. Tithes or taxes continue to figure
prominently in the legal landscape as before, but they are enveloped
in the confusion of the myriad laws attending the simultaneous devastation and construction on a massive scale that mark our time.
For all our alertness to new puzzles in a once familiar picture,
we are nonetheless schooled in the tradition that the law must lag at
a respectful distance behind the customs and values of the community, in the main confirming rather than innovating change. That tradition makes good sense so long as the lag does not deteriorate into
a lapse. Accepting the role of lawyers as respectful laggards, I pose
the question whether we have adequately stepped up our laggard
pace as the community quickens its own, to preclude a widening gap
between the law and what it governs.
The signs multiply that we have not. In some areas there have
been noteworthy, if not spectacular, advances; thus new concepts in
*
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property law have emerged to reflect new forms of intangible property, new patterns of ownership, or new problems of zoning. No comparable lexicon has developed, however, to reflect the significant
shift in emphasis from property to people. The need is urgent, now
that people have more years to live than before and more opportunities to amplify or disrupt the lives of others, particularly in advanced countries where people now include all people, notably
women and even children.
Where are the scholars who will assemble and evaluate widely
scattered Domesday Books chronicling new insights into human behavior? Where are the lawmakers who will concern themselves with
the newly discovered universes in human beings, the better to govern
the benefits and burdens of their relationships?
We cannot content ourselves with noting that there is increasing
communication between the scholars in law and in the behavioral
sciences.' Nor can we rest content that specialists such as psychiatrists are regularly summoned as expert witnesses in civil or criminal
litigation.2 Without discounting such sporadic use of law-related
knowledge, one must nonetheless recognize that it is not always subject to well-defined controls. Moreover, there is as yet little effective
use of law-related knowledge other than in the field of expert testimony." Scholars have noted, for example, that psychological learning
may be effectively used in the analysis of the perceptive power of
witnesses, 4 or in the strategic planning of the order of proof,5 or even
at the council tables of international law." Likewise, psychiatry may
be invaluable outside the courtroom in the counseling process.'
1 Behavioral sciences include anthropology, sociology, history, economics, political science, jurisprudence, psychology, education, information theory, cybernetics,
linguistics, sign-behavior, game theory, decision-making theory, value inquiry, and
general systems theory. Davis, Behavioral Science and Administrative Law, 17
J. LEGA ED. 137, 139 (1965). Genetics, neurology, neurophysiology, and psychia-.
try have also been viewed as behavioral sciences. See IKalven & Tyler, The Palo
Alto Conference on Law and Behavioral Science, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 366, 370 (1957) .
2 See, e.g., Greenberg, Social Scientists Take the Stand: A Review and Af~praisal of Their Testimony in Litigation, 54 MIcH. L. REV. 953 (1956) .
3 Cf. Fahr & Ojemann, The Use of Social and Behavioral Science Knowledge
in Law, 48 IowA L. Rzv. 59 (1962).
4 See Nagel, Law and the Social Sciences: What Can Social Science Contribute?,
51 A.BA.J. 356 (1965).
5 See Levin, The Law and Behavioral Science Project at the University of
Pennsylvania: Evidence, 11 J. LEGAL ED. 87, 90 (1958).
8 See Franck, Some Psychological Factors in International Third-Party Decision-Making, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1217 (1967); cf. A. LARsoN, DESIGN FOR RESEARCH
IN INTERNATIONAL Ruzz or LAW (1961).

7 See MacDonald, The Teaching of Psychiatry in Law Schools, 49
L.C. & P.S. 310, 313 (1958); Nagel, supra note 4, at 357.
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Such cases as Brown v. Board of Education8 illustrate how we

can use law-related studies in the courtroom. We have still much to
learn about the fact-finding process." It seems fair to speculate that
although a little learning in that regard may be dangerous, a great
deal might beneficently revolutionize our procedures for assembling
and evaluating facts. Thus the University of Chicago jury project
has demonstrated the superficiality of various notions about jury
behavior by yielding new insights into that behavior.10
Certainly we need to proceed from a little learning to a great
deal more in history and political science." The orderly evolution of
common law rules depends very largely on the judge's understanding
of the historical context in which the rules have evolved.12 The fictional unity of husband and wife, for example, can hardly be understood except in a historical context. In a recent case a wife who
conspired with her husband to commit a crime sought to evade
responsibility through the disappearing act of fictional unity with
her husband. The court took leave of the historical fiction, noting
that in a modern context "one plus one adds up to two, even in twogetherness."' 8
It is of equal urgency to infuse modern law with at least an
elementary knowledge of accounting and economics. We can ill afford judicial decisions that proceed from such quaint notions as the
equation of a term such as surplus with a literal surplus of cash. 4"
Though no one can be an expert jack-of-all-trades, it is not too much
to ask of any man learned in the law that he also be informed not
only of elementary accounting concepts, but of such significant economic developments as the accelerating rise of mergers, notably
8 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9 See generally J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949)T; J. MARSHALL, LAW AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN~ CONFUCTr (1966) .
10 The study produced evidence, for example, that if the plaintiff's lawyer
mentions that the defendant is insured and if in turn the defendant's lawyer objects and the jury is instructed to disregard the comment of the plaintiff's lawyer,
the jury is likely to award a higher verdict for the plaintiff than if there had been
no objection. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV.
744, 754 (1959). See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMrERICAN JURY (1966).
11 For a survey of the relevance of such studies to law see Nagel, supra note
4, and authorities cited therein.

12 See generally Allen, History, Empirical Research, and Law Reform: A
Short Comment on a Large Subject, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 335 (1957); Holmes, Law in
Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REV. 443 (1899) ; Morris, Law, Justice

and the Public's Aspirations, in NoMos VI, JUSTICE 170, 184 (C. Friedrich & J.
Chapman eds. 1963).
18 People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 880, 395 P.2d 893, 894, 40 Cal. Rptr.
845, 846 (1964).
14 See First Industrial Loan Co. v. Daugherty, 26 Cal. 2d 545, 551-56, 56162, 159 P.2d 921, 924-26, 929 (1945).
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conglomerate mergers. If two of a kind cannot melt into one, can
two odd balls thus glomerate?
At least there is a ferment of curiosity about the judicial process. Inevitably it tosses up curious new words such as jurimetrics,
whose advocates envisage it as determining where the action is in a
"calculus of legal predictability" based on mathematical logic and
electronic data retrieval.' The awe-inspiring sound of jurimetrics
inspires the hope that the Greeks may have another word for it that
will include the formulation of a calculus for legal unpredictability
and perhaps a golden mean between dead certainties and deadly uncertainties. The ideal would seem to be a judicial process that is neither totally predictable nor totally unpredictable. For even though
dogged retrievers lay heaps of dead data before the judge, he must
still say: "Let us consider the reason of the case. For nothing is law
that is not reason." 18
Nevertheless we should not disdain even the simplest sociological data that could prove useful to the law. Thus polls may shed
light on questions of fact such as whether an orange drink deceptively appears to the consumer to have qualities that it does not
have.' In a dissenting opinion concerning a trade name, Judge
Jerome Frank relied on a poll of his own to determine whether
women associated a girdle with a magazine because of their common
name.' 8
Once the facts are determined, a court can again make good use
of the behavioral sciences in arriving at an appropriate remedy or
sanction when a variety of them are available. In an unfair labor
practice case, for example, sociological data may help the court determine whether, if it approves a cease-and-desist order, it should
also approve an order for restitution of back pay.' 9 Certainly research findings in the behaviorial sciences are destined to play an
increasingly important role in criminal law, not only in adapting
punishment to the crime, but in amplifying our understanding of
antisocial behavior and in shifting emphasis from punishment to rehabilitation or treatment or incarceration that will protect society
Vonneuman, Book Review, 73 YALE L.J. 905 (1964). See Mermin, Computers, Law, and Justice: An Introductory Lecture, 1967 Wxs. L. REV. 43, 72-87.
16 Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 109 (K.B. 1705) (Sir John Powell).
17 See United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967
(3d Cir. 1951). See generally Greenberg, supra note 2, at 957-59; Nagel, supra
note 4, at 356.
18 Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976-78 (2d Cir. 1948)
(Frank, J., dissenting).
19 Rose, Problems in the Sociology of Law and Law Enforcement, 6 J. LEGAL
ED. 191, 200 (1953).
15
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from the incurable offender without blighting the rehabilitation or
treatment of other offenders."
As the law takes unto itself the law-related contributions of the
behavioral sciences, some of them reflected in its continually evolving rules, something new is added to a court's perennial dilemma of
choosing between an old rule that may be tried but questionably true
and a new rule that may prove true but has yet to be tried. Cumulative experience is inducing skepticism about the current reliability
of old rules and occasionally even about their original premises. We
are slowly learning that the age of a rule does not necessarily guarantee its original wisdom. For too long we accepted such rules with
inertia, "unjustifiably relying on the formula that all decisions are
created equal and deserve equally to survive." 2 1 The law gained
when "at long last we set an occasional ghost at rest in the past to
which it belonged, in the belief that however much the wisdom of the
ages deserves to survive, the foibles of the ages do not."" "We have
accepted too long and too passively museum-piece laws, an anachronistic in our time as amulets and asafetida bags would be in medi-

cine. '123

Here and there forward-looking courts have been alert to the
implications for law of law-related learning. They are still an all too
small vanguard, however, at a time when the wages of indifference
will be a loss of public confidence in the law. It is high time for widespread heed to such studies as those indicating that imprisonment
procedures often operate less to deter crime than to foster it. It is
ironic that too many prisons still serve as training schools in the
techniques of advanced crime and the evasion of capture and punishment. 24
Sometimes new data, like old rules, must be evaluated with
care. Following Miranda v. Arizona,25 a sample survey found that
nine out of ten suspects offered free legal assistance prior to questioning did not accept the offer. The survey staff concluded that
there was no significant difference between police interrogation procedures before Mirandaand after; 2 6 but the conclusion may be hasty
given the paucity of information on pre-Miranda procedures. There
20 See, e.g., Fahr & Ojemann, supra note 3, at 63-64.
21 Traynor, Unjustifiable Reliance, 42 Mnor. L. REV. 11, 24 (1957).
22 Id.
28

Id.
24 See Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 274, 275
(1967).
25 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26 Graham, Study in Washington Finds Most Reject Legal Aid When Offered,
N.Y. Times, July 9, 1967, § 1, at 51, col. 1.
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is some plausibility to the criticism that the Miranda decision may
itself spring from defective psychological grounds: the required
police warnings may tend to create an impression of fair and even
sympathetic interrogation conducive to incriminating statements.
Ironically the Miranda decision would then serve as an addendum to
the very police manuals it deplores that describe sophisticated techniques for eliciting such statements."
The moral is that the youth of a new rule no more guarantees
its wisdom than age guarantees the wisdom of an old one. Even
should it prove wise in the long run, its hasty promulgation may
meanwhile create more problems than it settles. There is apt to be a
painful interregnum between the abandonment of an old rule and the
effective implementation of the new when the latter is promulgated
without benefit of comprehensive studies on the variety and consequences of existing interrogation procedures and the feasibility of
improving them from the ground up, if necessary, to insure optimum
fairness to the accused.
It is more usual for courts to err, however, by failing to move
ahead at all than by moving ahead too hastily. They have grievously
lagged in major areas such as evidence. One scholar notes that the
rules admitting so-called declarations against interest and excluding
self-serving declarations are inconsistent with psychological learning.
In his view, any declaration is self-serving, "for it is motivated by,
and is an expression of, a need." 2 8 Assuming the soundness of such a
generalization, a court should make haste slowly to act upon it until
it reexamines its exclusionary rules; if all declarations are selfserving, should they then all be excluded, or should we first revise
the rules?

We have been slow to revise our ways with presumptions, as a
judge well knows who for years reluctantly acceded to the prevailing
rule in his jurisdiction that presumptions were evidence. 2 0 Again, we
have naively assumed that the presumption of innocence is taken in
earnest; yet one study reveals that many jurors believe a defendant
is guilty once the indictment is read.80 Such a finding serves as a
27 N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1966,

§

1, at 27, col. 1.
28 J. MARSHALL, supra note 9, at 38.
29 See Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal. 2d 388, 402-06, 247 P.2d 313, 321-24 (1952);
Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal. 2d 585, 590-98, 128 P.2d 16, 19-23 (1942); Traynor,
Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHi. L. REV.
211, 219 (1957). Under the new California Evidence Code operative as of January 1, 1967, "A presumption is not evidence." CAL. Evm. CODE § 600(a) (West
1965).
80 Levin, supra note 5, at 90-91.
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caution against the innocence of a presumption that presumptions
are invariably taken seriously.
In Professor Black's view, "The supposition that law can live
without recourse to social fact is literally insane . . . for it is tantamount to the separation of law from reality, to the making of practical decisions without knowing what they concern or estimating
their consequences." 3 1 Yet the very relevance of behavioral science
to law raises fundamental questions as to how it is to be integrated.
How, for example, is law-related knowledge to be presented in
the usual adversary proceeding? Note that it might be relevant in
one or the other of two distinct contexts. First, it might prove helpful
in determining the adjudicative facts, as Kenneth Davis has labelled
the facts to which law is applied in the process of adjudication. 3 2 A
psychiatrist testifying to a defendant's sanity, for example, is putting
adjudicative facts in the record. Second, law-related knowledge
might also prove helpful as a source of legislative facts, as Professor
Davis has labelled whatever data serve as the fabric of new rules
and policies."
The same data might serve as adjudicative facts or legislative
facts even in the same case.3" Thus medical knowledge that helps to
determine the adjudicative fact of a defendant's mental condition
might also be a source of legislative facts relevant to a redefinition of
so-called legal insanity.35
Ordinarily adjudicative facts are presented as evidence in the
trial court, where they can be tested by adversary procedures. A
comparable marshalling of legislative facts, however, is rare for
various reasons. The parties may not think of it. Their preoccupation is usually with the applicability of existing rules to the specifics
of their own case. They may lack the means to present comprehensive evidence of legislative facts, or they may view the cost of such
a presentation as exorbitant.
Hence it rests mainly with the courts to be alert to any need
81 Black, Changing (and Unchanging) Faces of Law, 51 YALE REV. 35, 38-39

(19 61) .

82 Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HAny. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942); Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 CoLUM. L. REV. 945,

952 (1955).
83 Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
supra note 32, at 403; Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 32, at 945, 952. See
also Alfange, The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 637 (1966); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sur. CT.
REv. 75 (P. Kurland ed.).
84 See Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 32, at 957-58.
85 See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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for data when it appears that a decision may involve a determination
of legislative facts. A court may find it appropriate at times to remand the case for testimony relevant to such facts." It may appoint
a master and order a reference. It may simply call for briefs and
oral argument as to one question or another.38
It may at times be appropriate for a court to take judicial notice
of findings in the behavioral sciences now that the range of materials
available for such notice is openly recognized as encompassing more
than simply matters of "common and general knowledge" or of "indisputable accuracy." 3 9 It has long been accepted that judges take
judicial notice of the findings of their own research;1" it is common
knowledge that there is a high correlation between the quality of a
court's opinions and the quality of its research. It is also efficient as
well as informative for courts to draw on the research and experience
of governmental agencies or other experts. 4 ' As early as 1761 Lord
Mansfield was relying on expert assistance "by conversing with some
gentlemen of experience in adjustments." 42 In commercial matters
he relied so regularly on businessmen that a group of them became
known as "Lord Mansfield's jurymen." 4 3 Indeed, one of them was
reputed to have "almost as much authority as the Lord Chief Justice
himself." 4 4
Many, and perhaps most courts are in need of better research
facilities, and increasingly they will need computer aids. Thoughtful
commentators have long been pondering how an appellate court can
also call upon experts themselves for help in arriving at legislative
facts when they seem indispensable to sound decision.4 5
Of course there must be fair and efficient allocation of the
limited resources of courts no less than of parties. Moreover, before
36 See Karst, supra note 33, at 95.

87 See Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 THa&v. L. REV. 1105,
1113-20 (1941).
38 See, e.g., Karst, supra note 33, at 95.
89 See Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 32, at 948-52.
40 See Note, Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal of Suggested Techniques
for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 692, 697-98 (1948).
41 See, e.g., Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of the Record by
Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 Wxs. L. REV. 39%
43-46.
42 Lewis v. Rucker, 97 Eng. Rep. 769, 772 (K.B. 1761).
43 4 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 120 (rev. ed.
1894).
44 Id.

45 See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 712 (1954); Beuscher, supra note 37;
Note, Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting
Them to the Courts, supra note 40, at 700-02; cf. Baade, Social Science Evidence
and the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany, 23 J. PoLiTics 421, 458-61
(1961).
46 See Black, supra note 31, at 38-39.
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a court relies on given data in arriving at legislative facts, it must
give each party an opportunity to examine such data and, if need be,
to contest their validity. Whatever the variations on a theme, the
ground rules still are those of our adversary system.4 7
There is growing recognition that law evolves most rationally in
a universe of discourse, reflecting the totality of significant facts and
things and ideas in any given argument. We need to spell out further
the criteria for ascertaining whether or not there is a need for legislative facts in any given case, but such articulation should proceed
normally as the cases themselves indicate when and why there is
need.
The real problem is to foster in judges and adversary lawyers
alike what Edmond Cahn has called a sense of "receptivity seasoned
with critical judgment"48 in the evaluation of law-related data. When
they are relevant to adjudicative facts their evaluation is simplified
by the usual rules of evidence. 9 When, however, they surface as a
basis for legislative facts, to be woven into new formulations of law
that may involve value judgments, they have entered the broad
realm of inquiry where, as Kenneth Davis notes, "findings or assumptions of legislative facts need not, frequently are not, and sometimes cannot be supported by evidence." 0 Indeed, if they were subject to the usual rules of evidence the trial judge would become the
final arbiter of law and policy. 5 '
If the data offered as a basis for legislative facts are not circumscribed by rules of evidence, relevance still offers a standard for
controlling their volume. There remains another problem: What
standards of precision should they meet to merit a cautiously tolerant reception?
Before turning our critical eyes to legislative-fact data, let us
heed Professor Kalven 's words that there is nothing "so wonderful
about the legal data we now have or the guesses we otherwise
make." 5 2 We can well heed, too, Judge Frank's reminder that legal
'47 See Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 32, at 979, 984; Karst, supra note 33,
at 109; Traynor, supra note 29, at 219.
48 Cahn, Jurisprudence, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 182, 183 (1956). See also Frankfurter, The Conditions for, and the Aims and Methods of, Legal Research, in
LAW AND POLITICS 287, 297-98 (1939) .
49 See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in The Administrative
Process, supra note 32, at 402-03 (1942) ; Note, Social and Economic FactsAppraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, supra
note 40.
50 Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 32, at 952-53.
651 See Note, Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal of Suggested Techniques
for Presenting Them to the Courts, supra note 40, at 699-700.
52 Kalven, Some Comments on the Law and Behavioral Science Project at
the University of Pennsylvania, 11 J. LEGAL ED. 94, 97 (1958).
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terms do not "possess clear, precise, stable meanings, easily to be
learned by thumbing a few judicial opinions and a legal dictionary.""
Moreover, we should not ever forget that "[t]he judicial process deals with probabilities, not facts...

."

As I once noted as to

adjudicative facts:
The problem is that the facts are forever gone and no scientific method
of inquiry can ever be devised to produce facsimiles that bring the
past to life..0.. However skillfully, however sensitively we arrange
a reproduction of the past, the arrangement is still that of the theater.
We acknowledge as much when we speak of re-enacting the crime or
the accident or perhaps some everyday event; we know better than
to speak of reliving it. The most we can hope for is that witnesses will
be honest and reasonably accurate in their perception and recollection,
that triers of fact will be honest and intelligent in their reasoning,
and that appellate courts will frame opinions with enough perspective
to guide others in comparable fact situations. . ..

The so-called adjudicative facts, even after they have been filtered through rules of evidence, carry no guarantee of fine precision.
Often they pass as objective despite marked adversary color. Often
they expand or contract in a viscous context of contradictory evidence, emerging at last in another viscous context of law to legitimize a finding of proximate cause or res ipsa loquitur or other legal
concepts of wondrous elasticity.
Should there not be at least as much leeway in standards of
precision for the data from law-related fields and for the legislative
facts drawn therefrom? Such leeway would be a realistic recognition
that the various behavioral sciences differ from one another not only
as to their current stages of development but also as to their inherent
capacity for precision." Then we could listen intently to a reading
of the most recent medical research performed with machines of
sensitive precision, offering measurable advances in diagnosis, and
still not turn a deaf ear to an account of revealing patterns of animal
behavior, derived from rough-and-tumble experimentation, offering
valuable clues to human behavior. We could scan the rolls of the
demographers, with their emphasis on numbers, and still not close
our eyes to the bird's-eye views and the worm's-eye views of the
ecologists, with their emphasis on relationships.
We could make good use of legal reasoning to narrow or widen
the leeway for the formulation of a so-called legislative fact, reason5 United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 416 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank,
J., concurring).
5 Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. REV.
635, 636 (1958).
55 Id.
56 See Fahr & Ojemann, supra note 3, at 61-62.
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ing that would still spring from the legal controversy itself, from
whether or not it afforded an appropriate base for giving the law a
new turn. Much might depend on whether the court had to consider
the formulation of a new common law rule or a new constitutional
rule or whether it confronted a problem of statutory interpretation.
It might also be of moment whether a decision would affect primarily rights arising out of property or contract, and would hence reflect a normally heavy reliance on settled law, or whether it would
affect primarily legal relationships where such reliance is of less
significance or none.
In sum, the process of decision as to legislative facts, like decision on any other matter, still calls for a well-tempered judge able to
bring sensitive judgment to a nexus of sensitive problems, as hospitable to new learning as he is versed in old lore, but alert to any
frailties in either. Such a judge is aware that the pompous rule of
yore has its match in the ersatz pronouncements of a passing new
day. We are indebted to Edmond Cahn for his warning that such
pronouncements are often deceptively enveloped in the accoutrements of scholarship. He evokes as illustration a book entitled Is
America Safe For Democracy?, written by William McDougall, at

one time a well-known professor of psychology at Harvard. In
Cahn's words this work was "filled with racist slander, crude propaganda, and arrant nonsense. The book provided a cloak of pseudoscientific respectability for agitation resulting in the Immigration
Act of 1921 and the national origins quota system." 5 7
Beware also, one might add, the expert opinions of experts.
Sensible men may agree that east is east and west is west, but
opinions are a matter of opinion. Too often the expert, well schooled
in his own field, sadly lacks the skeptical approach to his own materials that marks the educated man of law. When he is good, his
opinions can be of immeasurable help to the law. It is for a judge
schooled in skepticism to listen for the words of reason that distinguish such a man from the one who is merely opinionated, however glib he may be in the patois of his profession.
The very independence of judges, fostered by judicial office
even when not guaranteed by tenure, and their continuous adjustment of sight to varied problems tend to develop in the least of them
some skill in the evaluation of massive data. They learn to detect
latent quackery in medicine, to note patent markups in patent medicines, often as variable as the pronunciation of English. They learn
to question doddered scientific findings, to question dubious scien57

Cahn, supra note 48, at 194 (1956).
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tific discoveries, to edit the swarm spore of the social scientists, to
add grains of salt to the fortune-telling statistics of the economists.
When it comes to the final judgment, the judge is still in charge of
the store.5 8
If we keep in mind that the judge must constantly commit himself to decision and that the experts in law-related fields are under
no compulsion to do so, we begin to understand the need for legal
educators to serve as middlemen between them. They have the training and resources to systematize and clarify59 law-related materials
and to integrate their salient findings with comparable research in
law. Large though such a task looms, it can also achieve substantial
economies of research by establishing lines of communication between scholars in law and those working on law-related projects.60
At the University of California at Los Angeles, members of the Law
School faculty are now working closely with faculties from other
departments to that end. There are also two independent research
units, the Latin American Studies Center and the African Studies
Center, that are coordinating law and other disciplines in like manner. The Law School has also embarked on a new program designed
to lead to the law degree and a Master of Arts degree in Social Science over a four-year period.
Likewise at the University of California at Berkeley, the Center
for the Study of Law and Society, founded in 1961, is now an integral part of the new Earl Warren Legal Institute. Staffed with faculty members from both the School of Law and the School of Social
Sciences, it is carrying on valuable interdisciplinary studies.
The University of California will have a trilogy of law-related
centers now that the Law School at Davis is establishing an Administration of Criminal Justice Center with a grant from the Ford
Foundation.
Other law schools throughout the country are inaugurating like
programs. It is no accident that there has also recently come into
being a Law and Society Association, which publishes the Law and
Society Review.

There are always doubting Thomases who view innovation with
alarm, ostensibly because they doubt its value but really because
58 See A. PEKELIS, LAW AND SocIAL ActoN 39-40 (1950).

59 Cf. Freund, Dedication Address: The Mission of the Law School, 9 UTAH
L. REV. 45, 47 (1964) ; Hand, Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute
to the Teaching of Law?, 24 MIcH. L. REV. 466, 480 (1926); Hurst, Research
Responsibilities of University Law Schools, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 147 (1957).
60 Such communication, while of critical importance, has been slow in developing. See Kaplan, The Lawyer's Role in Modern Society: A Round Table, 4 J.
PUB. L. 1, 31, 32 (1955).
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they may lack capacity for moving ahead with the times. The law
has nothing to lose and much to gain by the accelerating interest of
law schools in relating law to kindred subjects. Herbert Wechsler
reminds us that:
legal thought becomes constructive and important only as it focuses
upon the problems of collective life it is law's function to resolve,
identifies the ends that should be sought in their solution, and marshals
the means that are adapted to those ends. Such a conception accords
relevance to all disciplines outside the law. .

.

. Law, viewed in that

perspective, appears less important as a branch of knowledge in itself
than as a context for the ordering of knowledge-all the knowledge
that has any bearing on the prudence of the choices that law involves. 61

The great law schools of the country, attached to great universities, are ideally situated to take the lead in what may become the
greatest age of reconstruction of the law that we have ever known.
Let us get the new Domesday Books ready for that reconstruction.
For the new law, like the old, can be a mighty force in a world that
has known too much of devastation.
11 Wechsler, The Law Schools and the Law, 18 IHav. L. ScH. BULL. 4, 5
(July 1967) .

